Friedrich Nietzsche: Dissector Of The Obtuse Truth Silencer
Nietzsche had a great deal to say about silence from both a positive and negative perspective. He was one of the first philosophers to make explicit the idea of “thinking out loud” so as to make manifest the deceptively muffled truths of reality. Thus, near the opening of Twilight of the Idols, he writes, “For once to pose questions here with a hammer and perhaps to receive for answer that hollow sound which speaks of inflated bowels — what a delight for one who has ears behind his ears — for an old psychologist and pied piper like me, in presence of whom precisely that which would like to stay silent has to become audible.”
He also, however, placed a high value on the role of silence in making philosophy and observes in the appendix to Ecce Homo that “Silence is as much of an instinct with me as is garrulity with our dear philosophers. I am brief; my readers themselves must become long and comprehensive in order to bring up and together all that I have thought, and thought deep down.” Nietzsche understood the difference between a text that loudly spells out its message and one that demands, in the gaps, in the interruptions, pauses and depths of thought, that the reader expand, mustering the force of intellect necessary to become a partner in the text’s creation by way of engagement with its ideas. This is a notion akin to that Thoreau articulates in Walden when he writes that ”Books must be read as deliberately and reservedly as they were written.”
Nietzsche reserves his quietest, deepest scorn for those readers who know not what they read because they in fact have not known how to live their own lives; readers who yet will use their own perceptual limitations as a yardstick of what actually exists. (This is the reverse of that enlarged sensory awareness we derive from John Cage’s attentive mind in the anechoic chamber at Harvard. ”There is no such thing as an empty space, or an empty time…try as we may to make a silence, we cannot,” Cage wrote after that experience.)
Nietzsche puts the case like this: “Ultimately, nobody can get more out of things, including books, than he already knows. For what one lacks access to from experience one will have no ear. Now let us imagine an extreme case: that a book speaks of nothing but events that lie altogether beyond the possibility of any frequent or even rare experience — that it is the first language for a new series of experiences. In that case, simply nothing will be heard, but there will be the acoustic illusion that where nothing is heard, nothing is there.”
Even if we hesitate before Nietzsche’s brazen self-annuniciation, we would do well to heed the warning that he and Thoreau express: reading worthwhile literature will strain our minds; it’s up to us to concentrate with sufficient seriousness of purpose to “hear” the meaning of the lines. But perhaps if we exist in too much noise, with too little quiet in our lives and sensibilities, we’ll perceive an absence outside of us which is really just a reflection of an interior void.








